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Abstract 
The provision of the extraordinarily deadly product of cigarettes is dominated by a small number of 
large and incredibly profitable shareholder owned companies that are focussed on cigarettes.  The 
legal duty of their managers to maximise shareholder wealth means that such companies vigorously 
fight any new public health measures that have the potential to disrupt their massive profit making, 
and have the resources to do so.  Protecting the public health is therefore made a lot more difficult 
and expensive.  We suggest that one way to counter this would be to actively design future tobacco 
control policies so that tobacco companies face mechanisms and incentives to develop in such a way 
that they no longer achieve the greatest shareholder value by focusing on cigarettes.  A proper 
tobacco diversification and exit strategy for the shareholders of the profit-seeking tobacco industry 
would protect the public health by addressing the current addiction to the continuation of the 
cigarette market.  The increasing popularity of e-cigarettes presents a particular opportunity in this 





In light of the fact that smoked tobacco (hence forth cigarettes for simplicity) is an 
extraordinarily deadly product, recent decades have witnessed a gradual increase in global 
tobacco control measures in order to reduce the multiple negative impacts upon society.  
Such measures have been fought by cigarette companies, thereby erecting significant 
obstacles to efforts to protect the public health.  The basic problem is that selling cigarettes 
is incredibly profitable, especially in Western markets [1, 2]. For instance, in 2013 the profit 
of the world’s top six tobacco companies was $44.1bn [3],  the vast majority of which was 
earned from combustion products, whilst Imperial Tobacco the long-time market leader in 
the UK has been estimated to have earned profit margins of up 68% in that market in recent 
years, which compares to a typical 12-20% margin for European non-tobacco consumer 
staple firms [2].    A sequence of corporate mergers and takeovers mean that we now have a 
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small number of large and extremely profitable transnational tobacco companies (TTC) 
dominating the global market for cigarettes outside China.  These firms are strongly 
focussed on smoked tobacco, and overwhelmingly on cigarettes, and so have a very strong 
incentive to maintain their position and the current status quo in tobacco markets.  Any 
attempt to introduce new public health measures which have the potential to disrupt the 
extremely lucrative cigarette business are fought ‘tooth and nail’, with states often facing 
massive legal bills if they are to successfully implement tobacco-control measures.  Witness 
the reaction to the introduction of plain packaging in Australia [4],  the future implantation 
of this in the UK and Ireland [5-11],  and in the USA the successful legal challenge against the 
FDA’s attempt to put graphic health warnings on cigarettes  [12].   The basic issue is that the 
TTC have every incentive to act in ways which prevent their extremely profitable market 
positions from being removed or eroded.  It is logical for them to vigorously object to public 
health measures because these might restrict their business activities and thus the ability to 
maximise shareholder returns (i.e. profits), which is after all, the purpose of the modern 
shareholder owned corporation [13].   Furthermore, the current extreme profitability of the 
TTC also gives them significant resources with which to go into ‘battle’ to protect their 
position and also to mitigate, bypass, and undermine any measures that are ultimately 
introduced.    In short, the current structure of the tobacco industry is one which requires 
on-going and repeated battles with the industry for each and every public health measure in 
the area of tobacco control in each country. Like a cornered animal, or any army facing an 
enemy committed to their total annihilation, a corporation in such a situation will fight long, 
hard, and viciously.  
If something could be done about the industry’s incentives to act in this way, there would 
be significant gains to be had in terms of addressing the global cigarette smoking epidemic, 
most especially in developing markets where public health regulation is less developed.  
Tobacco related health measures might be more quickly, easily, and cheaply introduced, 
and would most likely be more effective too, leading to better health outcomes for the 
public.   As a result,   smoking rates might be more easily reduced.  To do this, the nature of 
the incentives facing tobacco companies need to change.  The companies need to be given a 
business environment that makes the marketing of cigarettes less appealing than other 
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commercial opportunities on offer. Such policies have been effective in the past in helping 
to transition other industries toward products more beneficial to health.  Consider, for 
example, the combination of regulation and carrot and stick policies used to engender the 
transition from leaded petrol to unleaded petrol.   Regulations that reduced and ultimately 
eliminated the use of lead in fuels in many countries combined with such things as the 
incompatibility of leaded fuel with the catalytic converters (mandated in the 1970s in the US 
under the Clean Air Act) to create change.  Importantly, fiscal measures in jurisdictions such 
as Germany gave tax incentives to unleaded petrol that changed the economics, and 
thereby facilitated a transition to a less hazardous product that had been stymied for 
decades [14]. 
In this regard existing tobacco control work looking at the tobacco industry has begun to 
develop a set of policies which might start to address the negative effects of the profit 
incentives currently faced by the TTC.  These include policies that reduce the long-term 
profit potential of marketing cigarettes, such as: plain packaging; price cap regulation; limits 
on the composition of tobacco products; and even changing the structure of the commercial 
tobacco industry itself [15-21].  Each of these policies has its own merits but also reasons 
why they might be unappealing or difficult for politicians to implement [22].  For instance, 
the suggestion that the tobacco industry be taken out of the private sector would require 
several hundred billion US dollars (just the value of the TTC on the FT500 currently exceeds 
US$550 billion, so adding in a premium to nationalise these companies, plus the many 
smaller companies, becomes an astronomical sum) so to buy out the existing companies   
would be hard to justify politically during a time of global austerity, especially with there 
being no guarantee that such an action would actually protect the public health.  It is 
therefore likely that the commercial tobacco industry will be around for some time yet 
(most probably with increasing tobacco control regulation).  It just need not be so single-
mindedly focused on the marketing and sale of cigarettes (or other combustion-focused 
tobacco products), and thus the resulting epidemic of smoking-caused death and disease. 
Immediate steps are therefore needed if the harm caused by the fiduciary obligation of the 
TTC’s to maximise shareholder value is to start to be addressed in a meaningful way.  Ideally 
such measures would complement and facilitate the introduction of further tobacco control 
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measures in the future, such as the aforementioned suggestions. One such policy is to 
regulate tobacco companies/tobacco markets and design future tobacco control measures 
in ways which avoid backing the companies into a combustion-focused corner.   Public 
health goals can be hard enough to reach without unnecessarily turning the TTCs into 
cornered animals.  An extremely profitable tobacco company that only operates in the 
cigarette dominated tobacco market has the ultimate incentive to fight tobacco control 
measures because the company might cease to exist without cigarettes.  However, if the 
tobacco companies were provided an escape route outside the realm of cigarettes where 
they might go in their commercial activities, they might be less inclined to fight so hard for 
the continuation of tobacco markets as we know them.  That is to say, to implement 
tobacco industry policies in such a way that gives shareholders of TTC a mechanism and 
incentive to develop their businesses in ways that they no longer achieve the greatest 
shareholder value by focusing on cigarettes.  By making status quo products only a part of 
their commercial activities, and ideally a rapidly declining part over time, the incentives to 
maintain the status quo in the tobacco market would be considerably reduced.   Cigarettes 
would no longer be the imperative to corporate survival they are now.    
Quite how TTC could be offered such an escape route is one where there will no doubt be 
considerable debate as to what is appropriate.   Some will no doubt argue that such policy 
foresight is not (yet) required as the industry still has considerable freedom within existing 
tobacco control regulations and is, as yet, fighting nothing like a desperate cornered animal.   
Others will object to the very idea since all firms are currently free to use existing tobacco 
profits to diversify their businesses into other non-tobacco markets to ensure corporate 
survival (as for example, BAT did in the 1970s when it moved into retailing with the 
acquisition of the Argos chain in the UK and Saks Fifth Avenue in the USA, and in the 1980s 
when it moved into financial services with the acquisition of Eagle Star, Allied Dunbar, and 
Farmers Group which made it the largest UK-based insurance group [23]).  Whilst both 
views have merit, they also fail to recognise that the key point is to change the relative 
incentives faced by the companies in terms of their tobacco operations.  The companies 
need to be given incentives to move away from their current focus on extraordinarily deadly 
cigarettes so that they accept the winding down of combustion-based tobacco products 
5 
 
much like petrol companies moved to unleaded fuel.   Governments could facilitate or even 
force this change, through measures such as tax differentials [24], tax credits, profit levies, 
banning of cartel enhancing tobacco company mergers, or more direct measures such as 
differential price controls, product licensing, or even striking a long-term legal bargain with 
the industry regarding its future strategic direction, investment and conduct.  There are no 
doubt other possibilities that have yet to be thought of that could also serve to reduce the 
TTC focus on the maintenance of the cigarette business.  Such polices should be aimed at 
removing the huge profit incentive companies achieve supplying, sustaining, and creating 
demand for cigarettes.  Policy choices in this area would need to be mindful of the 
constraints operating in any particular market, such as the threat posed by illicit tobacco 
sales, and hence be selected accordingly.  If there were to be a strong threat of increasing 
illicit sales, the fact is that measures to address corporate profitability of cigarettes need not 
significantly change retail prices, thereby not impacting the likelihood of consumers  
switching to illicit products.  One such measure could be the imposition of a levy on 
cigarette profits which could not be passed on to consumers in the form of retail higher 
prices.   
National tobacco policy changes of the type needed to address cigarette profitability would 
no doubt be the subject of fierce TTC objections since they impact upon their profitability 
and potentially even their very essence, but victory in this particular battle could potentially 
fundamentally change the outlook for public health in the future.   
 
2. E-Cigarettes 
One immediate area for active consideration of such a wider tobacco policy is the growing 
popularity of E-cigarettes. The introduction of such alternative products (and similar ones 
such as cigarette-like nicotine inhalers) presents a dilemma.  These new products 
(henceforth all collectively referred to as e-cigarettes) have real potential to disrupt the 
tobacco market given their growing popularity [25, 26], significantly lower health risk than 
smoked tobacco products [27, 28], and more lenient government product regulations to 
date.  The level of appropriate regulation for such products is a matter of current debate but 
6 
 
it is clear they could be a real force for change that can significantly enhance public health 
[28-34].   However, for this to come to fruition the TTC, and regulators themselves, need to 
be prevented from handling the threat of vaping in the same way they have handled past 
threats to the combustibles market.    Such threats that may have caused disruption to 
cigarette dominated tobacco markets have generally been handled by regulation that stifles 
such products,  or by simply buying out the companies making such  products in order to 
monopolise the market and subsuming these products to an overall cigarette focused 
agenda. 
E-cigarettes can only change the tobacco market if they are sold in a way that actively 
competes against smoked tobacco.  For this to happen they need to be an alternative 
product that displaces lethal cigarettes rather than being sold in a way designed to protect 
existing products (e.g. as part of dual-use marketing strategy which promotes their use only 
when smoking tobacco isn’t possible).   How this revolutionary change can be facilitated will 
no doubt vary from country to country, reflecting individual market conditions and legal 
systems.  One possibility is to make sure the e-cigarette market is structured in a way that 
combines an open and competitive market dynamic with a regulatory system for the broad 
nicotine market (as mentioned in section 1) that encourages rapid product transformation 
away from cigarettes.  Especially important is to have the profitability of cigarette sales at a 
level less than that of alternative products.   In such an environment normal market forces 
could be expected to deliver the appropriate changes as companies naturally compete 
against each other within the regulatory framework that favours e-cigarettes over smoked 
tobacco.   However, for this to work there would need to be few restrictions on entry into, 
and the free operation of, the e-cigarette market.  In reality many countries have already 
introduced market and product regulations which mean that markets can’t be free and 
hence can’t be fully competitive, with the unintended consequence of protecting the 
combustibles market.  For example, product advertising and point of sale for e-cigarettes 
might be restricted.  Furthermore, free market forces are also likely to be distorted because 
TTC are large powerful organisations with significant financial resources, large distributions 
facilities, strong customer awareness, and strong brand names, all of which give them a 
significant advantage relative to independent participants in the e-cigarette market.  Such 
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advantages have already been seen in the e-cigarette market with tobacco companies 
lobbying for tough product regulation and standards, which ultimately favours their 
products and their organisations given their deep pockets. Consider, for example, Altria’s 
support for legislation that gave the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) the authority to 
evaluate products that could be lower risk [35]. 
In light of these likely difficulties with a laissez-faire competition based solution,  a second 
policy response to consider would be to complement a broad nicotine regulatory system 
with an active competition policy.  Global competition regulators (such as the Competition 
and Markets Authority in the UK, European Union competition authorities, or the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) in the USA) could more actively oversee the TTC  takeovers of e-
cigarette companies and purchases of related technology to ensure this is consistent with a 
transition out of cigarettes  rather than an effort to stymie competition for combustibles. 
Such agencies could complement this by requiring the TTC to divest their corporate interests 
in this area, as/when needed to spur industry transformation.  Current competition rules 
allow for such action in many countries if a wide definition of a nicotine market is adopted, 
as this would still be dominated by the TTC given the current value of tobacco sales and 
hence they could be argued to already have monopoly power which operates against the 
public interest.   Such a forced change in corporate incentives, if sufficiently robustly 
implanted, would mean that e-cigarettes could really compete with smoked tobacco since a 
myriad of companies would have strong market incentives to aggressively compete against 
cigarettes.  
However, the dilemma faced is that this sort of very active and vigorous implementation of 
competition policy is that, if not carefully implemented, it would essentially trap TTC in the 
business of making smoked tobacco products.   Their only option to break free from tobacco 
would be to diversify into unrelated industries and this would do nothing to diminish their 
incentive to maximise the profits they receive from smoked tobacco products.   Without any 
commercial interest in non-smoked nicotine products, TCC have the maximum possible 
incentive to continue cigarette sales and thus to use fierce competition to neuter the infant 
e-cigarette industry with its significant potential for improving the public health.  Indeed TTC 
would likely use their smoked tobacco products to compete even more fiercely and that 
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might result in lower prices for cigarettes with detrimental health consequences.   Indeed, 
any required separation of reduced risk products from the cigarette business would also 
prevent the TTC from investing in wider product development and innovation, since they 
could be limited to producing combustion products. 
We would therefore argue that in most markets a hybrid solution is required in order to 
capture the best of both worlds.  A broad regulatory framework that favours e-cigarettes 
(over combustion products) needs to be combined with a more limited activist competition 
policy that prevents TTC monopolising the e-cigarette market.  The aim would be to strike a 
balance that gives the TTC the incentive and means of escaping the smoked tobacco market 
by transitioning into e-cigarettes, but which also results in other participants in a dynamic 
and diverse e-cigarette market which actively competes against combustion products.    To 
achieve this we suggest that the TTC should be given incentives to invest and innovate in 
their own alternative nicotine product companies as they have already started to do. The 
key to making this policy compatible with wider public health goals is these alternative 
nicotine investments should be required to be consistent with enhancing,  rather than 
limiting, the market for alternative products.  In theory this might be something that could 
be achieved through differentiated profit potential based on relative risks alone.   
However, reality is likely to necessitate more direct action from competition authorities 
such as requiring that such TTC alternative businesses be mainly organically grown (not 
simply created by buying-up all potential competitors) and that they be operated 
completely independently of their parent tobacco companies, with this strict separation 
being stringently enforced by competition regulators.  In essence the cigarette and 
‘alternatives’ business  could then be thought of as two totally separate companies 
operating in related markets which compete against one another, but that happen to be 
owned by the same shareholders.   Whilst such separation would be unusual, it would not 
be without precedent within the business world.  In the UK for instance, BT is the dominant 
force in fixed-line telephony and associated services including broadband, but the 
infrastructure that BT (and other competing companies) use to provide these services is 
actually owned and maintained a  sister company to BT, called Openreach.    Openreach has 
a legal duty to treat BT and competing telecom providers on an equal basis, giving all access 
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to its infrastructure at the same cost and with the same level of service.  This is done by 
having two completely separate organisations which are owned by the same parent 
company.   Such similar separation could be mandated for tobacco companies developing 
nicotine product based businesses, and might also include particular provisions such as 
overseeing or even preventing the use of the same brands between combustion and non-
combustion products.   
Each business division in isolation would have an incentive to maximise its profits, but the 
profitability of the cigarette and alternatives businesses would move in opposite directions 
over time given the competing nature of the products being produced and the legislatively 
imposed broad constraints on the profitability of the cigarette trade.  Since competition for 
both divisions of the TTC would also be provided by third party e-cigarette companies, the 
parent TTC groups should find it in their interests to develop their alternatives division, 
especially in light of wider market policies that depress the profitability of combustion 
products relative to alternative products.   The overarching goal would be to create an 
environment such that the e-cigarette division would develop over time to become more 
profitable overall than their legacy combustion tobacco businesses, thus giving the TTC a 
strong incentive to expand the former at the expense of the latter as overall TTC parent 
group policy. Such a change would not happen overnight and would rely on an appropriate 
market environment being created alongside appropriate competition policy.  Policies such 
as those outlined at the end of section 1 are likely to be required in order to depress the 
profitability of combustion products in order to ensure parent companies start to favour the 
alternative division.  Ultimately this favouritism should lead to the running down of the 
combustion business in the same way that companies allow past brands to slowly fade once 
they cease on-going marketing support. 
In summary such an environment would allow TTC to create new areas of business that are 
related to their current areas of expertise, but which are likely to have a more sustainable 
future.  The companies would therefore be nudged away from their current addiction to 
deadly combustion products as they seek to reposition themselves into a more profitable 
long-term market position.  The public benefits by having more competition and innovation 
in less-harmful nicotine products which are actively sold to entirely displace cigarettes.   
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Such arguments might also be extended to encompass more than just e-cigarettes, and 
could well be applicable to a broad range of ‘next-generation’ reduced-risk products, 
possibly even including heat-not-burn type products.    
 
3. Conclusion 
No matter what future tobacco control measures are identified as being desirable for  public 
health,  in the absence of measures that change market incentives, severe resistance will 
always be encountered from cigarette companies.  As profit-making firms they are legally 
obligated to protect their shareholder-owners and therefore vigorously fight any measure 
that could cause their profits to disappear.  Such resistance makes protecting the public 
health significantly more difficult, slower, and more expensive.  However, such resistance 
might be mitigated over time if the TTC’s were to find that as the profitability of cigarettes 
diminished, the profit potential of alternative products was enhanced so they were not 
reliant upon  cigarettes for their corporate survival.  By using a variety of carrot and stick 
policies to influence corporate strategy, such as differential tax rates and profit levies on 
particular products, the tobacco industry might be shepherded away from its current 
addiction to the continuation of the cigarette epidemic.   In other words, protect the public 
health by incentivising a tobacco diversification and exit strategy for the shareholders of the 
profit-seeking tobacco industry.  One obvious starting point would be to compliment such 
broad policies by considering the impact of the ownership of E-cigarette firms given the 
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